Moving on From the New START: Is A Bilateral Arms Deal Between the US and Russia Necessary?

Obama and Medvedev sign the Prague Treaty, 2010.

On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between Russia and the United States expired after sixteen years of operation. The treaty, modeled after previous arms deals dating back to 1991, limited the number of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles to 700 and the number of nuclear warheads to 1,550. The deal also placed restrictions on Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The end of the New START marks the first period since the Cold War without a major arms deal between the US and Russia. Many believe that the lack of restrictions on the Russian nuclear program will lead to an arms race similar to the Cold War era, but I argue that the expiration of the treaty is not cause for panic and will not lead to drastic changes in international nuclear power dynamics. 

If Russia and Vladimir Putin are unwilling to agree to on-site inspections and detailed information sharing systems, there is no reason for the US to enter a bilateral agreement with so little oversight over Russian operations. In fact, the New START deal has not involved on-site inspections since 2022. COVID-19 first paused inspections, and Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended Russia’s participation in early 2023. As an alternative, the US has relied on satellite imagery and national technical means to monitor Russian nuclear capabilities for the past six years. Additionally, the treaty did not restrict Russia’s vast arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons or its diverse delivery systems, like the Poseidon underwater drone. While New START provided some comfort and security regarding Russian nuclear capabilities and intentions, its efficacy had been limited since inspections halted in 2020, and its expiration will not lead to a massive increase in Russian mobilization.

Furthermore, Russia faces issues in its industrial and economic sectors. Military engagement with Ukraine has made Russia ill-positioned for a new nuclear arms race. Not only has Russia’s GDP contracted by 2.6% over the last year, but the Kremlin is also struggling to keep its ambitious and costly nuclear programs on schedule. Recent satellite imagery confirms these setbacks, showing failed tests and development issues with its missile modernization program. Moreover, Russia is failing to produce SLBMs on schedule, and its heavy bomber production is virtually nonexistent. 

Even without a new nuclear arms deal to limit Russian production and stockpile, rational deterrence still ensures fairly certain nuclear peace. Both countries have second-strike capability and nuclear systems that are not vulnerable to accidental and unauthorized use. Despite the aggressive, arguably irrational war in Ukraine, Putin is a rational nuclear actor and will not use nuclear weapons offensively against a non-nuclear power like Ukraine. Such a strike would diminish the international community’s perception of Russia and turn Putin into an outcast–not to mention the nuclear domino effect that a strike would incur. Therefore, the United States does not need to scramble for an immediate nuclear deal; there are no clear signs of Russian intent to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, and traditional deterrence already provides sufficient protection against a strike on another nuclear power.

There are some drawbacks to a world without a nuclear deal between Russia and the United States. Without the certainty of a treaty, the US must rely even more on satellites to determine if and when Russia is conducting nuclear operations. Increased dependence on satellites creates a higher chance of misinterpretation and the potential for escalation through unwarranted strikes. Additionally, as geopolitical uncertainty grows, intelligence estimates become increasingly cautious and imprecise. Consequently, officials may request larger nuclear budgets that may not actually be necessary.

Finally, there is the question of how much the US can trust what Russian officials say. While Putin has suggested an intention to continue to follow New START guidelines, he also halted Russia’s participation in the on-site inspections and has not been overtly transparent over the past several years. However, despite the uncertainty and potential budget increases, the US should refuse to settle for an unfavorable deal just to have a symbolic treaty in place. Until Putin is willing to engage in verifiable and multilateral talks, the US should focus on its own modernization and rely on Russia’s struggling economy and traditional nuclear deterrence for security.

Image Credit

kremlin.ru, CC 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons