Counterterrorism Has Replaced State-Building in Somalia – And It’s Failing

Burundi peacekeepers prepare for next rotation to Somalia.

For decades, international policy toward Somalia has been framed around the single objective to defeat Al‑Shabaab, an al-Qaeda aligned terrorist group that emerged from Somalia’s civil war and has fought the Somali government and international peacekeeping forces since the mid-2000s. From mass casualty bombings to attacks on aid workers, the group’s violence poses a profound threat to Somali civilians and institutions. Yet the dominant counterterrorism strategy, led in large part by the US government and its partners, has produced a troubling paradox. In seeking to combat terrorism, international intervention has weakened the very state it hoped to build.

Somalia’s problem has never been solely terrorism—it has been the absence of legitimate governance. The country was formed in 1960, but soon after fell under the military dictatorship of Siad Barre after a 1969 coup. Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991, triggering the civil war that fragmented the country. Since then, Somalia has struggled to reestablish a functioning state. A federal government formed through indirect elections in 2012, but tensions between regional authorities and the central government persist, while separatists in Somaliland and Al-Shabaab continue to contest territorial control. 

To counter this volatility, international counterterrorism policies have revolved around expanded drone strikes, targeted killings, and relaxed battlefield rules. In March 2017, the White House broadened targeting rules in Somalia, allowing strikes with reduced vetting requirements and contributing to a sharp increase in lethal military operations. Spending on these operations has been substantial. Since 2007, the US has disclosed more than $2.5 billion in counterterrorism assistance to Somalia (excluding classified military and intelligence spending), and annual counterterrorism expenditures now exceed the Somali government’s tax revenue. This investment has produced limited returns. Military operations in Somalia have failed to significantly weaken Al-Shabaab while crowding out diplomatic and development efforts needed to support governance. 

The human cost of this has also been severe. In rural southern Somalia, civilians find themselves trapped between terrorist attacks and the threat of airstrikes. While official US reports indicate only a handful of civilian casualties, independent monitoring by Airwars estimates that dozens of civilians have been killed in counterterrorism operations since 2007. These civilian casualties, alongside corruption among security forces and perceptions of foreign interference, can fuel resentment and reinforce insurgent narratives. Each attack by militants provokes further military escalation, which in turn sustains the cycle of violence.

In such a fragmented system, counterterrorism policies that prioritize military action over governance reform risk reinforcing conflict rather than resolving it. Military operations can remove militants from towns, but they cannot build a functioning government. Somalia’s political system is decentralized and clan-based, and stability requires negotiations that address federalism, corruption, elections, and local governance. 

As political scientist Ken Menkhaus argues, Somalia’s crisis is not a single failure but three overlapping ones: the collapse of the central government, protracted armed conflict, and lawlessness. Each issue requires a different solution, but instead of wasting resources on funding military operations, international partners should invest in governance institutions that already exist but remain underdeveloped. For instance, the Financial Governance Committee, which reviews large procurement and concession contracts above $5 million to improve transparency in state spending, and the Office of the Auditor General, which audits government accounts and financial controls, are anti-corruption mechanisms already in place that simply need stronger funding, political backing, and consistent enforcement. Alongside these government efforts, civil society initiatives such as the Somali anti-corruption organization Marqaati operate a public accountability reporting system that collects citizen complaints about bribery, electoral fraud, and misuse of public funds. 

The Somalia Crisis Response Plan 2025-2026 also highlights numerous solutions that go beyond counterterrorism, and redirecting even a small share of counterterrorism spending toward initiatives like these would produce measurable gains. Such an approach recognizes that insurgencies thrive where governments lack credibility and capacity. Without accountable institutions and inclusive politics, military victories cannot translate into a sustained, durable peace. Still, none of this diminishes the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. The group continues to carry out deadly attacks, recruit fighters, and obstruct humanitarian aid. Counterterrorism will remain necessary, but counterterrorism alone cannot build a state. If international actors want a stable Somalia, they must treat state-building not as an afterthought, but as the central task.

Image Credit

U.S. Army Africa, CC BY 2.0, via Flickr